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The Honorable Neal Dunn 466 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Laurie Trahan 2233 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representatives Dunn and Trahan,

Thank you for your request for information to inform new Protecting Americans from all-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA). The ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿ (ASM), on behalf of more than 38,000 members in the United States and around the world, extend its thanks to Reps. Dunn and Trahan for your efforts to craft new PAHPA legislation to protect Americans from public health threats. ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿is one of the oldest and largest life science societies, and our mission is to promote and advance the microbial sciences.

As you work to draft new PAHPA legislation, ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿urges you to prioritize the following provisions:

Presidential Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a complex, cross-sector challenge requiring collaboration across human health, animal health, agricultural and environmental systems with coordination across the federal government. The President’s Advisory Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria (PACCARB), established in 2014 and authorized by Congress in the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act (PAHPA), serves as a critical federal advisory body charged with addressing the treat of AMR. However, PACCARB has not convened since early 2025. ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿recommends that new PAHPA legislation reauthorize the PACCARB and require HHS to report to Congress on the status of PACCARB and its plans to convene in FY2026.  

PACCARB convenes private-sector stakeholders and federal agencies to provide information, advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to ensure that U.S. government programs and policies to combat AMR are effective, coordinated and evidence-based. In addition, PACCARB reports and recommendations inform AMR strategies across hospitals, public health agencies, agricultural operations and industry, extending its impact well beyond the federal government. HHS should reconvene the PACCARB to support the federal response and cross-sector coordination of efforts to combat AMR.

Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)

In recent years, researchers and institutions have faced inconsistent and evolving guidance regarding biosafety and biosecurity oversight. In 2024, the Office of Science and Technology Policy issued the U.S. Government Policy for Oversight of Dual-use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential, with an implementation deadline of May 2025. Shortly before the implementation deadline, the Trump administration issued the Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research Executive Order (EO), halting the implementation of the prior EO and pausing certain “dangerous” gain of function research. Despite the 120-day implementation deadline set in the EO, the White House has not yet released new guidelines. In the interim, NIH has canceled grants determined to be “dangerous” gain of function without transparent review or appeals mechanism, creating uncertainty for federally funded institutions and potentially disrupting critical biodefense and public health research.

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿recommends that Congress work with federal agencies and other biosecurity stakeholders, including biological scientists, biosafety professionals and research institutions, to assess the current landscape of federal biosecurity authorities, identify gaps or redundancies and produce a coordinated implementation plan to define and streamline oversight of pathogen research. A coordinated, stakeholder-informed approach would improve accountability, reduce regulatory fragmentation and strengthen national biosecurity without unnecessarily impeding responsible scientific research.

Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity Grant Program

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) grant program allows state and local public health agencies to expand their ability to detect and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks. During the COVID-19 pandemic, ELC funding allowed public health agencies to expand testing capacity, modernize infrastructure and recruit and retain essential laboratory personnel. 

Recent rescissions of COVID-19 supplemental funding have raised concerns about the sustainability of these gains. ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿recommends that Congress require HHS and the CDC to report on the impact of these recissions on public health laboratory staffing, surveillance capacity and readiness to respond to future infections disease outbreaks. Clear data on public health capacity losses will help inform future preparedness investments and prevent backsliding in core public health infrastructure. 

Biothreat Radar Detection

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿supports language included in the Senate’s 2023 PAHPA reauthorization bill (Sec. 106) to formally authorize the CDC’s National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) to monitor infectious diseases. Initially established with COVID-19 supplemental funds, NWSS provides real-time, community-level data on the prevalence of infectious diseases, including COVID-19, flu, mpox, RSV and measles, and shows potential for monitoring other emerging infectious disease threats. 

Wastewater monitoring is a cost-effective, population-level public health early warning system. The program allows public health professionals and communities to react in real time and communicate with the public to prevent disease spread by identifying the presence of pathogens without the need for individuals to be tested or to show symptoms of infections. For example, during the 2025 highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak, CDC leveraged wastewater surveillance to monitor viral spread, providing actionable data even when clinical case detection was limited. 

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿recommends that PAHPA legislation formally authorize NWSS at $120 million annually, consistent with prior annual supplemental investment levels. Stable authorization and funding would ensure continuity of this critical surveillance infrastructure and strengthen the nation’s preparedness for future infectious disease threats. ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿supports authorizing language limiting the use of wastewater monitoring to monitor for infectious diseases.

Antimicrobial Resistance—PASTEUR Act 

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿urges Congress to include language from the PASTEUR Act () into PAPHA reauthorization legislation. The PASTEUR Act, sponsored by Reps. Carter, Peters, Langworthy, Levin and Carey, provides novel solutions to address the threat of AMR and to encourage the development of new antimicrobials.
Because antimicrobials must be used judiciously to retain effectiveness against resistance and are typically used for a short duration given the acute nature of infections, most large pharmaceutical companies have exited antibiotic research and development due to a lack of return on investments. Small biotechnology companies now drive much of the innovation of novel antimicrobial development but often struggle to remain financially viable. These challenges require a novel incentive structure that provides a predictable return on investment independent of the volume of antimicrobials used. Under PASTEUR, the federal government would contract with innovators to ensure access to a reliable supply of novel antimicrobials through payments that are decoupled from sales volume. 

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿also emphasizes that revitalizing the antimicrobial pipeline must be paired with strong diagnostic capacity. Rapid, accurate diagnostics are essential to distinguish bacterial from viral infections, guide targeted antimicrobial therapy and inform stewardship decisions. Without appropriate diagnostic tools, new antimicrobials risk inappropriate use, accelerating resistance and undermining the long-term effectiveness of the very products that PASTEUR seeks to incentivize.

PASTEUR would also provide needed resources to antimicrobial stewardship programs, with priority given to rural, safety-net and critical access hospitals and long-term care facilities. Stewardship programs have demonstrated success in improving patient outcomes and reducing inappropriate antibiotic use, but many facilities lack sufficient resources necessary to fully implement these programs. 

Public Health and Bio-Preparedness Workforce Loan Repayment Programs

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿urges Congress to include the Public Health and Bio-Preparedness Workforce Loan Repayment Reauthorization Act () in PAHPA legislation to ensure continuity and stability of this critical workforce development program.

A strong nationwide public health and infectious diseases clinical workforce is critical for biosecurity and effective outbreak and pandemic readiness and response. Estimates indicate that an additional 80,000 full-time equivalents—an increase of nearly 80% from current numbers of public health workers—are needed to provide a minimum package of public health services. These workforce gaps undermine surveillance, laboratory capacity, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) prevention and coordinated emergency response efforts. The Public Health and Bio-Preparedness Workforce Loan Repayment Programs, authorized in 2022 through the PREVENT Pandemics Act, were designed to strengthen and build the public health and infectious diseases workforces by providing up to 3 years of targeted student loan repayment in exchange for service in health professional shortage areas, medically underserved communities, federal facilities or state or local health departments. 

Regional Biocontainment Laboratories

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿supports language included in the Senate’s 2023 PAHPA reauthorization bill (Sec. 404) to authorize and strengthen the Regional Biocontainment Laboratories (RBLs). These facilities provide critical high-containment research capacity to safely study emerging and high-consequence pathogens and support rapid scientific response during public health emergencies.

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿also encourages Congress to include authorization and sustained support for the national biocontainment laboratories in any forthcoming PAHPA legislation. The regional and national biocontainment laboratories work in tandem, forming a coordinated infrastructure network that enables secure pathogen research, countermeasure development and surge response capacity. Together, they provide the laboratory backbone necessary to advance vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics during outbreaks.

USDA Programs

The U.S. Department of Agriculture plays a key role in preventing pandemics by stopping the spread of agricultural animal and plant pathogens. The Food Safety and Inspection Service prevents dangerous agricultural pathogens from entering the U.S. food supply while the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service works to halt outbreaks on U.S. farms. ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿urges Congress to include One Health coordination across human, animal, plant and environmental health in PAHPA legislation.

ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿and its members stand ready to work with Congress to craft public health preparedness legislation. If we can be of further assistance, please contact JR Kane, Government Relations Manager at the ºÚÁÏÕýÄÜÁ¿, at jkane@asmusa.org.

Thank you,

Amalia Corby
Director of Federal Affairs
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